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“When we buy a young boy …” 
Eleanor Drywood 
 1. Introduction 
The title of this chapter is drawn from a quotation by the long-standing man-
ager of Arsenal FC, Arsène Wenger, in which he rigorously defends the foot-
ball industry against accusations that the recruitment of talented children 
from abroad to play in Europe’s professional football leagues is a form of 
modern slavery: 
 …I’ll show them what we do and how we treat the boys  … In some places in Brazil some 
boys do not have the same conditions or treatment that we have. Medically, psychological-
ly, and 'footballistically'. It is ridiculous [to call it child slavery]  … When we buy a young 
boy we train him and give him a chance to play. We promote, we educate and we integrate. 
That's why we have success.  
Arsène Wenger, Manager, Arsenal FC1 
What is striking about this quotation is that hidden amongst the impressive 
list of benefits offered by professional football clubs to young recruits is the 
phrase ‘when we buy a young boy’. The casualness of its use suggests a nor-
mality to the idea that a football club can ‘own’ a child. Wenger is also selec-
tive in focusing only on success stories at a handful of elite clubs and ignor-
ing the murky underworld that is fuelled by a market in young foreign play-
ers. This is a phenomenon associated with unscrupulous agents, manipulative 
practices and high levels of exploitation in developing regions of the world. It 
is also one in which many young children are promised a lucrative career in 
football leagues across Europe, yet very few go on to succeed in the profes-
sional game. In 2001, and in response to concerns surrounding these practic-
es, football’s global governing body, the Federation of International Football 
Associations (FIFA), banned the international signing or transfer of players 
under the age of 18 (Article 19 FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Trans-
fer of Players (RSTP)). This made it (theoretically, at least) impossible for 
clubs to sign players from abroad until they became adults (subject to limited 
exceptions). There is much evidence, however, that this prohibition remains 
ineffective and that a buoyant trade in child footballers from abroad contin-
                                                          
1 As cited in Jones 2009. 
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ues to thrive. As a 2014 expose in the UK’s Telegraph newspaper explains: 
‘[t]he intensity of the quest for fresh recruits is such that some clubs know-
ingly take risks by bringing in underage players or by acquiring them via 
murky means’ (Brown 2014). The purpose of this chapter – the first analysis 
of this area in academic literature – is twofold. First, it will establish the 
phenomenon surrounding the recruitment of young foreign footballers to 
Europe’s professional game as an important area of scrutiny in children’s 
rights studies. Second, through an analysis of the European Union’s (EU) 
expanding activities in relation to both sport and children’s rights, it will 
argue that the supranational body can, and should, be more proactive in ad-
dressing the failure of football’s governing bodies to address the injurious 
children’s rights consequences of the current football transfer system.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the social phenomenon surround-
ing the recruitment of young players from abroad to Europe’s football 
leagues. Through the discussion, reference is made to practices that represent 
a threat to the well-being and rights of the children involved, as understood 
with reference to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). The aim of this section is to establish that, for all the very positive 
potential effects that participation in elite football may have for some chil-
dren, the operation of the football transfer system raises some serious ques-
tions surrounding the rights and welfare of young foreign players.  
It is then argued that the current European football transfer system was 
born of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) decision to 
apply free movement law to the football profession in the seminal case of 
Bosman (Case 145-93, [1995] ECR I-4921), and that the supranational organ-
isation therefore bears some responsibility to mitigate the ill effects of the 
buoyant trade in young footballers from abroad that has thrived under this set 
up. Whilst it is acknowledged that the precise impact of the Bosman ruling 
remains debated, this decision, at the very least, brought the football transfer 
system within the scope of EU law, such that – read in conjunction with its 
growing children’s rights agenda – it is unconscionable for the supranational 
body to ignore the issue of young migrant footballers. 
A crucial part of this paper is to scrutinise attempts by football’s govern-
ing bodies to stem this practice through a prohibition on the international 
transfer of minors. There is a prominent rhetoric from football’s global regu-
lator, FIFA, and sport’s highest judicial body, the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS), espousing the importance of protecting minors and the need for 
the aforementioned outright ban to be applied effectively. Yet, the evidence 
is that clubs continue to recruit minor players from abroad in significant 
numbers. As the Wenger quotation above demonstrates, there are many with-
in football who are strongly opposed to the current prohibition on the interna-
tional transfer of minors. The possibility of discovering the next global su-
perstar, for relatively little financial outlay, ensures that clubs will reluctantly 
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cede to a ban on this type of recruitment. The argument ventured here, there-
fore, does not posit any single legal solution; instead, it suggests that the EU 
has the political leverage, the legal competence and the range of policy tools 
at its disposal to spearhead activities aimed at exploring more effective re-
sponses to the negative impact of the football transfer and recruitment system 
on the rights of migrant child players.  
 2. Children’s Rights and Young Migrant Footballers 
Current recruitment and transfer practices within the football industry, par-
ticularly in relation to young foreign players, raise a number of pertinent 
children’s rights and welfare questions. At one end of the spectrum are the 
deeply worrying, headline grabbing stories of rogue agents operating in de-
veloping countries, duping vulnerable young players out of large sums of 
money on the promise of a career in football that never materialises (Meneses 
2013; BBC World Service 2014; BBC News 2014; Brown 2014). These 
practices, often likened to child trafficking, or described as a modern form of 
slavery,2 certainly encompass numerous rights violations and leave a ques-
tion mark over the extent of complicity on the part of a multi-million pound 
sporting industry that benefits so lucratively from the discovery of the next 
African, South American or Asian superstar. On the other hand, there are 
success stories: young migrant players who secure a contract with a European 
club, fulfilling their dreams of a career in professional football – perhaps 
most famously, Lionel Messi who, recruited by FC Barcelona at the age of 13 
from his native Argentina, has enjoyed a prolific career in Europe and is now 
one of the most decorated players in global football. These success stories 
nonetheless pose important children’s rights questions, albeit subtler (but 
ultimately thornier) ones, around the ethics of the football industry: is remov-
ing a child from his home and family and transporting him across the world 
for the sporting and commercial gain of a football club ever justifiable? Un-
derstanding and conceptualising the complex range of children’s rights issues 
at play here is a challenge. What follows is the first mapping out of this so-
cial phenomenon from the perspective of children’s rights studies. Whilst 
there is only limited research on this topic, recent years have seen growing 
                                                          
2 Whilst these practices are often referred to as trafficking and slavery in the colloquial sense, 
it is not clear that they would fall within either definition in the strict legal sense: see Article 
1(1)of the Slavery Convention 1926, Article 2.1 of the ILO Convention (No. 29) concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labour and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organised Crime. 
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media interest in the practices surrounding the recruitment of young players 
from abroad, the resulting journalistic investigations offer valuable insights 
for the social phenomenon at the heart of this analysis. The available evi-
dence is presented with reference to the CRC, the accepted global touchstone 
for children’s rights values, to highlight where current recruitment practices 
present children’s rights issues. 
2.1 The experiences of migrant child footballers 
In recent years, the phenomenon of rogue football agents operating in devel-
oping regions of the world, and in particular Africa, has attracted media at-
tention. These individuals are shown to be targeting young players, luring 
them to Europe with the promise of a trial at an elite European club, often 
using a process similar to people traffickers. Emboldened and inspired by 
superstars such as Cameroonian Samuel Eto’o and Ivorian Didier Drogba, 
who have enjoyed highly lucrative careers at top European clubs, young 
players and their families can be highly vulnerable to approaches by rogue 
agents. This is addressed in the 2012 documentary Slaves to Football: 
In Africa, millions of young boys dream of escaping poverty by becoming professional 
footballers. But where there are dreams, there are people willing to exploit the dreamers. 
All over Africa, scammers posing as football agents are duping the families of young men 
out of their savings for the promise of professional football careers in Europe and else-
where. (Von Einsiedel 2010) 
A study commissioned by the European Commission in 2009 looked at avail-
able evidence to chart this phenomenon (KEA/CDES/EOSE 2009: 121). 
According to their findings, the process begins when an intermediary spots a 
player and promises to facilitate his recruitment to a European Club. These 
players frequently receive coaching at informal ‘academies’, which provide 
the most basic facilities and rudimentary training, whilst often working in 
conjunction with rogue agents (Von Einsiedel 2010). The prevalence of these 
academies is astonishing: as an example, there are an estimated 500 in Accra 
alone and ‘thousands more spread across Ghana’ (McDougall 2008). Accord-
ing to the European Commission report, the next step is that the intermediary 
pressures the player’s family for money, the result often being that they sell 
their possessions or take out a loan having been convinced of a quick return 
on their investment (KEA/CDES/EOSE, 2009: 121). Slaves to Football sug-
gests that many of these players never make it to Europe, the promised trial 
materialising at clubs offering less lucrative careers in places such as the 
Cape Verde Islands (Von Einsiedel 2010). Those that do travel to Europe, 
following illegal and dangerous journeys, are 'put to the test' by several clubs  
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… until the intermediary is satisfied or gives up the process’ (KEA/CDES/
EOSE 2009: 121). 
Those young players who fail to secure a contract with a club are often 
abandoned by the agent, with reports of a growing homeless population of 
young footballing hopefuls across Europe (McDougall 2008), particularly in 
cities with a former colonial link to regions of Africa such as Paris and Brus-
sels. An ex-Cameroon youth international, Jean-Claude Mbvoumin, has set 
up a charity, Culture Foot Solidaire, based in Paris, supporting these young 
players. He outlines the situation these children face when they fall prey to an 
unscrupulous agent: 
So few make it, but they all come, more and more each year, and they are getting younger 
all the time. Thousands of kids to France. Everything is fluid in Africa – borders and pass-
ports. An increasing number of boys are coming by plane, not just the boats through the 
Canary Islands. One-month visas are easy to get with bribes in Africa, but after they fail 
their trials they stay on. They have nothing to go back to. These kids are as young as 14, 
they end up on the streets, worse off and in more danger than they could ever be at home. 
(Cited in Mcdougall 2008) 
Given that, on the whole, these young men have travelled illegally to Europe 
using false documents they then become irregular migrants with no right to 
work and no income source. Furthermore, many are embarrassed by the pro-
spect of returning home because of the sacrifices their families have made for 
a career that has failed to materialise (KEA/CDES/EOSE 2009: 121). They 
find themselves, as depicted in the documentary Slaves to Football, with “no 
passport, no permit and destroyed psychologically” (Von Einsiedel 2010). 
Jean-Claude Mbvoumin is keen to add that whilst most of the available in-
formation focuses on Africa, this is not a problem limited to this region, stat-
ing that it affects South America and eastern Europe as well (as cited by 
Aarons 2011). Indeed, in 2013 Juan Pablo Meneses published a book expos-
ing the exploitation of young footballers in South America, highlighting the 
highly aggressive recruitment tactics utilised by European leagues in this 
region (Meneses 2013). 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are huge success stories surround-
ing migrant players who are taken on by European clubs. In 2013, rival Span-
ish teams FC Barcelona and CF Real Madrid both signed prodigious talents 
from Japan aged just ten years, prompting a flurry of YouTube clips pro-
claiming the two players as the next stars of European football (South 2013). 
Players recruited to the top teams in Europe are placed in elite football acad-
emies, offering state of the art training facilities and bespoke educational 
programmes (Longman 2011). The potentially huge benefits to children who 
are able to access these cannot be ignored: the opportunity to play the game 
they love, with the accompanying benefits to health and well-being, along-
side the possibility of a lucrative career. Indeed, as Arsène Wenger argues in 
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the quotation that began this chapter, the experiences of many of these young 
players fly in the face of accusations of trafficking and slavery.  
On the other hand, it cannot be presumed that all young migrant players 
who secure a professional contract are safeguarded from exploitative practic-
es and situations that threaten their security and well-being. Even if they are 
amongst the privileged few who are taken on by a clubs, feelings of isolation 
and loneliness can be more common amongst migrant players who are often 
living apart from their families, in culturally and linguistically unfamiliar 
environments. This is something that Jean-Claude Mbvoumin of Foot Sol-
idaire argues ought to be addressed by the industry: 
When you’re discovering a new country, when you’re injured, when you’re at the end of 
your tether, you’re alone because you’re far away from your family. You’re left to fend for 
yourself. (FIFA 2008) 
Furthermore, whilst players dream of a career at a top European team, many 
end up in the lower leagues of less prestigious footballing nations. Here, the 
training and conditions offered are vastly different from the elite academies 
of the richest clubs. Often players are pressured into short-term contracts 
with precarious conditions that disadvantage them (KEA/CDES/EOSE 2009: 
121).  
2.2 The children’s rights issues at play 
The experiences of young migrant footballers outlined above vary considera-
bly. At one extreme, there is growing evidence of a set of practices that – in 
addition to being criminal, with their slavery and trafficking-like characteris-
tics – entail egregious violations of principles found in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. For example, the obligation on states 
parties to combat the sale and trafficking of children (Articles 11 and 35) and 
the range of provisions to protect children from various forms of exploitation, 
including economic (Articles 32 and 36). Furthermore, without appropriate 
support in place, uprooting a child from their home to move abroad at a 
young age can adversely impact their right to maintain contact with their 
parents (Article 9) and quite possibly interrupt their schooling in a way that is 
inconsistent with their right to education (Article 28). The failure of the foot-
ball industry to engage with these practices is, of course, highly problematic 
and points to the need for intervention from outside the game. 
Furthermore, as important as addressing these striking violations of the 
rights of the child is, they should not allow us to ignore the more controver-
sial questions raised by the success stories: that is, those young people who 
succeed in securing a professional career with an elite club following migra-
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tion to Europe. Is the very fact of allowing minors to play professional foot-
ball incompatible with children’s rights principles? This question goes to the 
heart of debates on child labour (see further: Ferreira in this book) and 
whether commercial and, in this case, sporting gain for adults on the back of 
work carried out by children is justifiable. These arguments engage the prin-
ciples found in Article 33(1) CRC which protect children from ‘work that is 
likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be 
harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social 
development’. There has been quite limited debate on the application of child 
labour legislation to sport (see, as an exception: Donnelly 1997). Broadly 
speaking, where young players register with a football academy, the voca-
tional and educational nature of the programme they are offered allows the 
activities to fall outside the scope of employment. However, a residual ques-
tion mark hangs over the impact of the clear sporting and commercial gain 
(current or future) for clubs when they invest in young players on debates 
around exploitation and abuses of power in the context of children’s rights. 
Interestingly, Michel Platini, the President of UEFA, European football’s 
governing body, views the participation of migrant children in professional 
football as unjustifiably exploitative: 
Paying a child to kick a ball is not that different from paying a child to work on a produc-
tion line. Both amount to exploiting child labour. And when you pay a child or their par-
ents to travel overseas, when you uproot them from their home environment, when you 
make them emotionally disorientated, I call that child trafficking  … Some people talk 
about the free movement of workers. I am talking about the protection of children. Some 
talk about competition law. I am talking about the right to respect human integrity; a child's 
right to grow up surrounded by their friends and family. (Michel Platini, UEFA President, 
Speech to European Parliament, February 2009) 
Furthermore, although players who register with elite football academies 
largely escape the egregious children’s rights violations that can occur as part 
of the football recruitment process, their successes nonetheless fuel these 
more insidious practices. As long as elite clubs continue to recruit young 
foreign players from overseas and these players enjoy high profile careers, a 
market will exist for unscrupulous agents and abusive practices. 
Of course, whilst considering these questions, the fact that FIFA has had a 
prohibition on the international signing and transfer of players under the age 
of 18 in place since 2001 should not be forgotten. The fact that this sort of 
recruitment continues to take place – and is fuelling a set of practices that 
raise important and significant children’s rights questions – underlines the 
need for a more effective interrogation of the phenomenon and its regulation. 
In light of this, the attention of this analysis now turns to the role that the EU 
– working alongside the football industry – can play in spearheading and 
facilitating this process. The essence of the argument that follows is that the 
EU, through its landmark ruling in the Bosman case, brought the football 
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transfer system within the scope of EU law. The result is a set of conse-
quences for young migrant players that, whilst almost certainly unintentional, 
have fuelled the children’s rights issues outlined above. The EU has, in re-
cent years, affirmed its commitment to an increasingly ambitious children’s 
rights agenda across the range of its activities – this, it is argued, compels a 
response to the issue of young migrant footballers from the supranational 
body. 
3. Football’s Transfer and Recruitment System:  
Creating a Market For Young Migrant Footballers 
To understand the current – highly liberalised and highly commercialised – 
football transfer system, brief consideration must be given to its roots as part 
of a restrictive employment agreement which ‘shackled’ players to clubs 
‘like a ball and chain’ (Maguire 1999: 102). Following the decision of the FA 
to professionalise the sport in 1885, a system of player registration was intro-
duced to prevent individuals from appearing for several different clubs in the 
same season (see further: Magee 2006-7). This situation operated heavily in 
favour of clubs, however: once a player was registered, he was unable to 
move employers without the consent of the club who held his registration, 
even following the expiry of his contract. Clubs soon realised the potential to 
sell registrations, receiving a monetary sum as consideration for releasing the 
player – what is known as a transfer fee (see further: McArdle 2000: 19). As 
Monroe states: the system “was designed to protect smaller clubs by prevent-
ing players from club hopping, instead [it] resulted in the registration becom-
ing something to be bought and sold” (Monroe 1999: 31). Pearson observes 
that, in some instances, this not only restricted the freedom of players to 
choose their employer, but, at its extremes, also prevented footballers from 
playing professional football completely (Pearson 2015). This situation was 
played out elsewhere in Europe: whilst the discussion here has considered the 
jurisdiction of the English FA, developments in France and Germany fol-
lowed a similar trend (KEA/CDES/EOSE 2009: 29). Indeed, the international 
transfer system became irreversibly ‘Europeanised’ with the CJEU’s land-
mark ruling in the case of Bosman (1995). This decision laid the groundwork 
for a professional game that now – intentionally or otherwise – effectively 
incentivises clubs to recruit talented players from abroad at as young an age 
as possible. 
Jean-Marc Bosman was an out of contract player with RC Liège in Bel-
gium who wanted a transfer to French side FC Dunkurque. Liège would not 
allow Bosman to leave unless Dunkerque paid them a transfer fee; however, 
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the two clubs were unable to reach an agreement. A reference was made to 
the CJEU in respect of Bosman’s case, with the player arguing that his free-
dom of movement rights as a Community worker (ex-Article 48 EEC, now 
Article 45 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) were 
breached by a transfer system that effectively prevented him from taking up 
work in another EU Member State. The Court accepted Bosman’s argument 
and ruled that, once a player’s contract had expired, his original club could 
not demand the payment of a transfer fee, the latter only being permissible 
where the player moved clubs during their contracted period (Bosman deci-
sion: paras. 92-104). In effect, in one fell swoop, the Court had put an end to 
the payment of transfer fees across Europe.3 The precise impact of Bosman 
on the football transfer system is complex and continues to be debated to this 
day; however, some effects of this decision are clear. First, it put players very 
much in the driving seat when it came to negotiating a transfer. Not only 
were they able, when out of contract, to move clubs without the need for their 
former and prospective employer to agree on a transfer fee, they were also in 
a stronger bargaining position in relation to salaries and signing on fees as 
their new club had not had to pay anything to secure their services. It is, 
therefore, often observed that the market liberalising effect of Bosman ush-
ered in an era in which players are able to demand vast sums of money in 
return for their footballing services (KEA/CDES/EOSE 2009: 26).4 
The CJEU made a second important ruling in Bosman (1995), namely that 
nationality based quota systems – which had previously existed in some do-
mestic leagues and European football competitions, limiting the number of 
‘foreign players’ that could be fielded by a team – also constituted an obsta-
cle to freedom of movement of workers (Bosman decision: paras. 116-120). 
A number of arguments had been raised to support nationality based quotas 
including, interestingly for this discussion, that they safeguarded against an 
influx of foreign (both European and non-European) players and the risk that 
this may stifle youth development at a local level. The Court rejected this 
argument; instead pointing out that by opening up the job market in other EU 
                                                          
3 For accuracy, it should be noted that, as a free movement of workers case under EU law (ex-
Article 48 EEC, now Article 45 TFEU), this ruling initially applied only to transfers be-
tween clubs in different Member States. Further changes in 2001 applied the Bosman prin-
ciples to players moving between two clubs in the same country (see FIFA’s RSTP). This is 
not to say that payments are no longer made to former clubs upon the transfer of a player, 
and these are often informally referred to as transfer fees. Following Bosman the football 
industry agreed upon a new system with the following features: compensation is paid to the 
club that trained the player each time he transferred up until the age of 23 (Article 20 
RSTP); where a player breaches their contract without just cause a compensation fee will be 
paid to the original employing club (Article 17 RSTP). 
4 This is not to suggest that Bosman is the only factor that has contributed to the increased 
earning power of footballers in over the past 20 years, merely that it was a key development 
in this trend. See further: KEA/CDES/EOSE 2009 KEA 2013. 
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Member States the abolition of quotas increased future employment opportu-
nities (Bosman decision, para. 134). A further justification for the quotas was 
that they would prevent the richest clubs from signing the best players from 
abroad, thus threatening the competitive balance of the sport. It was accepted 
that the preservation of competitive balance in sport was a legitimate objec-
tive; however, the Court was of the view that the existing quotas did not 
achieve that aim as there are no rules limiting the possibility for clubs to 
recruit the best national players, thus undermining its achievement (Bosman 
decision: para. 135). 
The most obvious impact of this aspect of the ruling in Bosman is the 
striking internationalisation of the football profession. Whilst the Bosman 
ruling itself initially applied only to transfers within the EU, it stimulated a 
shift in the culture surrounding football recruitment whereby clubs began to 
think globally when recruiting players. A recent analysis of the players in the 
first team squads of clubs in top division leagues in Europe revealed that the 
percentage classed as ‘expatriate’ has risen steadily over recent years and 
now stands at 37% (Poli/Besson/Ravenel 2014: 6). Similarly, the proportion 
of players who have experienced some sort of international migration during 
their career is 49%. Indeed, in the English Premier League, a team has not 
named a squad made up entirely of English players since February 1999 
(Taylor 2011). Put quite simply, the migrant footballer has become a very 
common – and growing – phenomenon, with most players accepting that a 
move abroad will probably be required at some point in their career. 
Furthermore, football’s governing bodies’ attempts to mitigate the effects 
of Bosman’s removal of nationality-based quotas have arguably created a 
situation which encourages clubs to ensure that, where they do recruit players 
from abroad, they do so at as young an age as possible. In 2005, UEFA intro-
duced its ‘homegrown players’ rule, requiring each club to have four club-
trained players and four players trained by a club in the same national foot-
ball association in its 25-man squad. A player is ‘homegrown' if, regardless 
of their nationality, they have been trained by their club (or by another club 
in the same national association) for at least three years between the ages of 
15 and 21 (Freeburn 2009). Since the 2006-7 season, this rule has applied to 
all European club level competitions and, latterly, in many domestic leagues. 
The purpose of this rule is, according to UEFA, to encourage the local train-
ing of young players and to prevent richer clubs from ‘hoarding’ the best 
international talent (UEFA 2014). Ironically, however, if the protection of 
young players is UEFA’s priority, what the rule effectively does is incentiv-
ise clubs to recruit players from abroad at as young an age as possible: if a 
player joins a club before the age of 15, he will satisfy the homegrown player 
rule by his 18th birthday. This concern was raised by the European Parlia-
ment’s Resolution on the Future of Professional Football in Europe, in 
which it stated that “additional arrangements are necessary to ensure that the 
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home-grown players initiative does not lead to child trafficking, with some 
clubs giving contracts to very young children (below 16 years of age)” (Eu-
ropean Parliament 2007: para. 35).5 
Two key points have emerged from this discussion of the football transfer 
system. The first is that, following the Bosman decision in 1995, various 
factors have combined to create an environment in which a market in young 
footballers from abroad is likely to thrive. There is a relatively low financial 
outlay in recruiting players from overseas, particularly those who, at a young 
age, have none of the high costs associated with more established players. 
Furthermore, if the footballing services of that child can be secured before 
they turn 15, they are an even greater asset to their club, effectively becoming 
a ‘local’ player on turning adult. The second point to observe is that EU in-
tervention contributed to this trend. In a general sense, this decision linked 
EU law and the structure of the football transfer system inextricably and 
indefinitely. More specifically, whilst a potentially problematic impact on the 
rights and welfare of young aspiring footballers overseas was almost certain-
ly not an intended consequence of the Bosman ruling, it appears to be its by-
product.  
The next section will go on to discuss attempts by football’s governing 
bodies to allay fears surrounding aggressive recruitment of young players 
from abroad in the post-Bosman era and highlight the current weaknesses of 
these regulations, before the final section argues that the EU has a role to 
play in addressing these shortcomings. 
4. Attempts by Football’s Governing Bodies to Regulate 
the Trade in Young Migrant Footballers 
Following Bosman, football’s governing bodies and representatives of both 
the international players’ union (FIFPRO) and the domestic leagues, worked 
with the EU to establish a new set of rules governing transfers. Central to 
these negotiations was the status of young migrant footballers. The result was 
FIFA’s Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), intro-
duced in 2001, which prohibit the international transfer of players under the 
age of 18 (Article 19), subject to certain exceptions. These regulations apply 
globally and, therefore, bind all players and clubs registered with any nation-
al football association who take part in official competitions. The provision 
applies not only to players moving between clubs, but also to initial registra-
                                                          
5 It should be noted that there is limited empirical evidence of the actual impact of the rule on 
clubs' recruitment strategies (Dalziel et al 2013: 63). 
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tions (Article 19(3) RSTP). Therefore, the regulations (in theory at least) 
prevent any registration of non-national minors from abroad, a significant 
limitation on the capacity of clubs to recruit talent on a global scale. Fur-
thermore, FIFA have gradually introduced a series of further checks in an 
attempt to identify unscrupulous practices on the part of clubs and agents and 
ensure compliance with Article 19. Since 2009, all international transfers and 
first registrations of minors are considered by a sub-committee of FIFA’s 
Players’ Status Committee.6 This is facilitated by a computer based transfer 
matching system, which requires clubs to input information on all non-
national players who are the subject of a transfer or first registration. This 
information relates to proof of residence for the player and players’ parents, 
as well as the academic education and football training that will be offered by 
the receiving club. Without the approval of the sub-committee the transfer 
cannot go ahead. 
Evidently, however, there remains a buoyant trade in young international 
footballers, and as long as clubs continue to sign these players the exploita-
tive practices surrounding this market are likely to remain. It is not always 
clear how clubs manage to circumvent the prohibition on transfers of minors: 
most reports of this practice in the news media simply state that a signing has 
taken place, with FIFA’s ban (and its ineffectiveness) rarely mentioned. Of 
course, the possibility exists that forged documents are used, or that adminis-
trative errors occur (some, presumably, less accidental than others).7 Equally, 
however, some attention should be given to a number of exceptions to the 
general prohibition on the international transfer of minors that are enumerat-
ed in Article 19 RSTP. Whilst each of these exceptions serves an important 
purpose by allowing young players to pursue a career in professional football 
in fairly uncontroversial circumstances, they nonetheless open up possibili-
ties for manipulation by clubs desperate to sign young overseas players. This 
section will begin by discussing each of these exceptions and (where applica-
ble) pointing to the ways in which they weaken the overall prohibition. Fol-
lowing that, cases in which FIFA have taken action against clubs for breach-
ing Article 19 RSTP will be outlined. Here it is noted that the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport (the final court in disputes relating to FIFA Regulations) has 
interpreted Article 19 RSTP strictly, giving a high priority to the aim of the 
provision in protecting minors. This section will demonstrate that a promi-
                                                          
6 Details on how these procedures protect minors is found on FIFA’s website (2011): 
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/footballgovernance/news/newsid=1493936/ 
(2014-13-10). 
7 Indeed, in some places it is suggested that when they were recently sanctioned for a breach 
of Article 19 RSTP, Barcelona FC took advantage of the possibility of registering their 
players with either the Spanish FA or the Catalan FA for the purposes of the transfer match-
ing system. See further: http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?textid=40903&site_id=11&level
1=&level2=13914 (2014-13-10). 
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nent rhetoric espousing the importance of protecting minors through an un-
compromising stance in relation to foreign recruitment is evident at the high-
est echelons of football governance and from sport’s judicial bodies, yet there 
is a significant mismatch with the effectiveness of this stance in reality. This 
is the basis for the argument that a form of legal or policy intervention is 
required to stimulate work towards a more effective regulatory response. 
4.1 The Article 19 RSTP exceptions 
The first exception to Article 19 RTSP is that, within the EU/EEA, a lower 
threshold is set and players may move between countries from the younger 
age of 16 (Article 19(2)(b) RSTP). This allows intra-European migration of 
footballers at a younger age than the wider prohibition. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that this exception is not restricted to EU citizens (that is 
nationals of one of the Member States (Article 20(1) Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union)), instead extending to the transfer of a player of 
any nationality between two clubs within the EU/EEA. Anecdotally, there are 
suggestions that agents of young players from outside Europe make use of 
countries within this area who have more relaxed nationality laws, or ones 
where there is a ready trade in false passports, to gain access to the territory.8 
Once a player is legally resident in an EU/EEA country, or they have signed 
with a club within that area, they can then access the remainder of the territo-
ry whilst under the age of 18. 
Second, an exception exists in relation to players who live near a national 
border and intend to register with a club in a neighbouring country, a group 
that will be termed ‘frontier players’.9 This provision applies anywhere in the 
world, but is obviously particularly relevant within Europe where the EU’s 
free movement laws have made travel between Member States for work es-
pecially commonplace. The relevant provision states that both the player’s 
home and the registering club must be within 50km of the border, and that 
the distance between these two locations must not exceed 100km (Article 
19(2)(c) RSTP). This is a fairly unremarkable exception to the wider prohibi-
                                                          
8 It is not appropriate to cite an authority on this point, given the evidence is anecdotal. How-
ever, the suggestion has been made that Bulgarian passports can be obtained by young aspir-
ing players with relative ease, thus granting them access to all clubs in Europe. 
9 This term evokes the concept of a frontier worker in EU law. Broadly conceived, this refers 
to someone who works on one side of a border but lives on the other, and returns home at 
least once a week and is, therefore, entitled to special provisions in relation to access to so-
cial security benefits (Article 1(b) Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 
1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families 
moving within the Community (OJ L 149, 05/07/1971, 0002-0050)  
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tion: it envisages a scenario in which there is technically an international 
dimension, but in reality any such registration would not require a player to 
be uprooted from their family and home. Indeed, at elite level, it is far from 
unusual for a young sportsperson to travel a distance of 100km within one 
country; this provision simply ensures that players living near a border are 
not denied the opportunity to access local clubs, for the mere reason that 
travel just happens to involve crossing a border. 
The final exception found in Article 19 RSTP applies when the player’s 
parents move to the country in which the new club is located for reasons not 
linked to football (Article 19(2)(a) RSTP). On the one hand, it is an appropri-
ate exception: it would be problematic if FIFA’s ban on international trans-
fers and registrations of minors created barriers to the opportunities offered to 
the children of recently arrived migrant families. On the other hand, this 
provision seems to provide a way of circumventing FIFA’s regulations. As 
happened in the case of Cádiz (CAS 2005/A/955), discussed below, the ‘rea-
sons not linked to football’ can be created after the club has expressed an 
interest in the player and – if these are believed by the Players’ Status Com-
mittee – the transfer of a minor will proceed as an exception to Article 19 
RSTP. Clearly, where facts that contradict the contention that the decision to 
migrate preceded the club’s interest in the player come to light, the club and 
player risk contravening Article 19 RSTP and the transfer will be banned, as 
happened in Cádiz. However, although there is little research on this point, 
anecdotally it is suggested that this provision provides the most common 
route around FIFA’s prohibition on the international transfer of minors. For a 
fuller understanding of how FIFA’s prohibition on the international transfer 
of minors operates and how Article 19 RSTP has been interpreted by sport’s 
highest judicial body, the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the principle cases 
in the area will now be discussed. 
4.2 A children’s rights rhetoric from FIFA and CAS? 
In February 2005, Carlos Javier Acuña Caballero, a 16 year old Paraguayan 
player with Club Olympia de Paraguay, signed a contract with the Spanish 
club Cádiz CF. He had been scouted by an agent at an under-20s internation-
al tournament in Colombia the previous month. The Paraguayan FA blocked 
Acuña’s transfer on the basis of non-compliance with FIFA’s Regulations on 
the Status and Transfer of Players, including Article 19 RSTP: at 16 years of 
age, Acuña was a minor and fell within the prohibition on international trans-
fers (here from Paraguay to Spain). At the club’s request, the Spanish FA 
appealed to the FIFA’s Players’ Status Committee. The evidence put to the 
Committee was that the Cabellero family were in financial difficulty and so 
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intended to move to Spain for Mrs Cabellero, Carlos’s mother, to take up a 
job in a restaurant. In other words, the club argued that the family’s move to 
Spain was for reasons unrelated to football, thus bringing the player’s situa-
tion within one of the exceptions permitted by the RSTP.  
The Players’ Status Committee was not satisfied with the explanation of 
the family and Cádiz CF, ruling that the transfer would breach FIFA regula-
tions, a decision that the Club subsequently appealed to CAS. Before the 
Court, the appellants first attempted to have FIFA rules on the protection of 
minors declared void, arguing that they conflict with mandatory provisions of 
public policy, relying in particular on several provisions of international law, 
Swiss law and Spanish law.10 CAS rejected this argument, ruling that limiting 
the international transfer of minors is a legitimate objective and, given that 
the regulations provide for ‘some reasonable exceptions’, they are propor-
tionate to that aim (Cádiz decision: Para. 7.2.2.). In its ruling on this point, 
CAS endorsed the importance of ‘protect[ing] young players from interna-
tional transfers which could disrupt their lives, particularly if, as often hap-
pens the football career fails, or, anyway, is not as successful as expected’ 
(Cádiz decision: Para. 7.2.2.). Furthermore, the Court, having heard evidence 
afresh, was of the view that that the accounts of the player, his mother and 
Cádiz FC were not credible – the ruling on the facts being that the mother 
was offered her job a week after the contract between her son and the club 
was agreed. The transfer, therefore, did not fall within the exception, the 
Court ruling that the family had in fact moved to Cádiz exactly because of 
the player’s football career. 
Overall, the Cádiz case represented a robust defence of the purpose behind 
Article 19 RSTP: no one reading the case would be in any doubt as to the 
importance placed by CAS on the protection of minors as a legitimate objec-
tive, justifying restriction on players’ international movement. This was lent 
further force by the subsequent decision in Midtjylland (CAS 2008/1/1485). 
FC Midtjylland, a Danish Premier League Club, has an established coopera-
tion with FC Ebedei, a Nigerian club based in Lagos. This agreement gives 
Midtjylland the purchase option on talented players from the Nigerian club. 
Over the course of the 2006-7 season, six Nigerian players aged 16 and 17 
were registered with the Danish club. The issue in this case was that the play-
ers were granted licences by the Danish FA as amateur players and the club 
argued that as non-professionals they fell outside the scope of Article 19 
RSTP. There was no dispute that the players fell within the Danish FA’s 
definition of amateur players: they had been issued with student visas by the 
Danish Immigration Service and were studying at public schools (albeit part-
                                                          
10 The Court gives short shrift to this argument so the reported decision is not particularly 
expansive on its substance. However, the club and player seem to have argued that the play-
ers’ right to pursue his profession is not upheld and the principle of non-discrimination on 
the grounds of sex, nationality and race is contravened (see Para. 3). 
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time to allow for their football training) and received only a modest contribu-
tion towards board, lodgings and pocket money. In deciding that Article 19 
RSTP did apply to the amateur players in question, the Court advocated a 
purposive reading of the provision, in light of its clear intention to protect 
young people:  
Any other construction would be contrary to the clearly intended objective and spirit of the 
regulation  … to apply Art 19 of the RSTP restrictively  … could result in obviating protec-
tion of young amateur players from the risk of abuse and ill treatment which was clearly 
not within the anticipation of the scope of the regulation. (Midtjylland decision: Para. 
7.2.5) 
A further outcome of the Midtjylland case was that CAS confirmed FIFA’s 
Players’ Status Committee will accept two further exceptions to Article 19, 
limited to the situation of students who are signed from abroad. This is the 
case where: relocation is for the purposes of studies, not football related ac-
tivity; or relocation is in the context of an agreement between the football 
association of origin and the new club, within the scope of a development 
programme subject to strict conditions (e.g. the provision of education, for a 
limited duration etc.). In relation to the facts before them, CAS ruled that the 
Nigerian players did not fit into either of these categories, so their transfers 
were not permitted.  
In April 2014, FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee sanctioned FC Barcelona 
and the Spanish Football Federation (RFEF) for breaches relating to the in-
ternational transfer and registration of players under the age of 18.11 The 
sanctions arose from investigations through FIFA’s Transfer Matching Sys-
tem and related to activities during the period 2009 to 2013 concerning ten 
minor players. The most high profile of these was Seung-Woo Lee, signed by 
Barcelona in summer 2011 at the age of 13 and touted as the ‘Korean Messi’. 
Now 16, Lee is a star of Barcelona’s youth team and has signed a contract to 
remain at the club until 2019, reportedly turning down a number of lucrative 
offers to play elsewhere in Europe.12 The punishment imposed on FC Barce-
lona was a transfer ban at both national and international level for one year 
and a fine of 450 000 Swiss francs (approximately €370 000). The club was 
also given a period of 90 days to regularise the situation of the relevant minor 
                                                          
11 At the time of writing, the full decision of the Disciplinary Committee has not been made 
public, with the fullest account offered by a press release on FIFA’s website: http://www.
fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/news/newsid=2313003/ (2014-23-10). Further information 
is provided in the official response from Barcelona FC, published on their website: http://
www.fcbarcelona.com/club/detail/article/official-statement-from-fc-barcelona-on-the-sancti
on-imposed-by-fifa-s-disciplinary-commission (2014-23-10). A useful analysis is provided 
by van Maren and Marino 2014. 
12 As an aside, it is interesting to note that, regardless of how he came to sign for Barcelona at 
the age of 13, the option to move elsewhere in Europe club became available to him when 
he turned 16 as transfers within the EU/EEA are permitted under Article 19 RSTP from this 
age upwards.. 
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players. The Spanish Football Federation was fined 500 000 Swiss Francs 
(approximately €410 000) and given one year in which to reform its regulato-
ry system for the international transfer of minors. In the press release pub-
lished on FIFA’s website, the governing body noted the ‘serious’ nature of 
the infringements as justification for the heavy penalty imposed. Further-
more, FIFA stated that that ‘the protection of minors in the context of inter-
national transfers is an important social and legal issue that concerns all 
stakeholders in football’.13 
The sanction imposed on FC Barcelona appeared, at first sight, to be sig-
nificant on a number of fronts. First, whilst few had any doubts that, with a 
reported annual turnover of more than €400 million, FC Barcelona would 
have little problem meeting the financial penalty, the imposition of a transfer 
freeze had the potential to place a significant burden on the club. At the end 
of the 2013-14 season, the first team squad was widely considered to be in 
need of strengthening in certain key positions and the club had been linked 
with a number of high profile transfer targets (van Maren and Marino 2014). 
At the time the sanction was announced, the possibility that the club would 
not be able to make these reinforcements was significant enough to be seen 
as a threat to its likely success in domestic and European competitions for the 
following season, no trifling matter for a club of Barcelona’s reputation and 
stature. Secondly, this is the first high-profile case brought under Article 19 
RSTP against a leading European club, such as FC Barcelona. The cases 
against Cádiz FC and FC Midtjylland concerned teams that do not enjoy the 
same global sporting profile as Barcelona. In the Midtjylland case, before 
CAS, the Danish club argued that they were unfairly discriminated against by 
FIFA who, it was alleged, was targeting smaller clubs whilst ignoring in-
fringements of Article 19 RSTP by large European teams, citing FC Bayern 
München as an example. This argument was rejected by the Court, who re-
ferred to the legal principle that ‘no one can claim for equal treatment by 
referring to someone else who had adopted illegal conduct without sanction’ 
(Midtjylland decision: Paras. 7.5.1-7.5.6). 
However, the argument illustrates that there is a belief that larger clubs are 
immune from sanctions for violation of Article 19 RSTP, a perception that is 
significantly challenged by the case against FC Barcelona. Thirdly, La Mesia 
is a highly respected football academy, with a reputation for nurturing young 
players in a holistic manner which places high value on educational oppor-
tunity and personal development, as well as elite football training (Longman, 
2011). As such, the message sent out by the sanctioning of this club is that 
transfer of minor players from abroad will not be tolerated regardless of the 
level of opportunity offered – and regard for individual welfare – when the 
player arrives in Europe. This case was not about targeting just the more 
                                                          
13 See the FIFA website: http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/news/newsid=2313003/ 
(2014-02-02). 
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exploitative practices associated with the recruitment of young players from 
abroad; instead the decision to sanction Barcelona suggests that FIFA, con-
sistent with the wording of Article 19 RSTP, views any transfer of a minor 
from outside Europe as problematic. Indeed, FIFA’s press release emphasises 
the level of importance attached to the protection of minors by the Discipli-
nary Committee:  
 … the protection of minors in the context of international transfers is an important social 
and legal issue that concerns all stakeholders in football. Above all, the committee high-
lighted that while international transfers might, in specific cases, be favourable to a young 
player’s sporting career, they are very likely to be contrary to the best interests of the 
player as a minor. On the basis of this analysis, the committee concluded that “the interest 
in protecting the appropriate and healthy development of a minor as a whole must prevail 
over purely sporting interests”. (FIFA 2014) 
Accordingly, it seems that FIFA, in imposing such a significant and high 
profile sanction in the interests of upholding the protection of minors, has 
sent out a clear message in relation to the recruitment of young players from 
abroad. FC Barcelona, however, vehemently defended their actions, stating 
that: ‘FCB [FC Barcelona] creates people before they create athletes, a fact 
that has not been considered by FIFA, which has applied a penalty ignoring 
the educational function of our training programme’.14 The club appealed 
FIFA’s decision and – crucially – the transfer ban was suspended until the 
appeal could be heard. This decision significantly reduced the force of the 
initial sanction. It allowed the club to make a number of signings during the 
summer of 2014, such that the squad could be reinforced in a way that built 
capacity for any future reinstatement of the ban. Whilst FIFA rejected the 
appeal, the potency of the initial sanction was lost: the transfer ban with im-
mediate effect would have hurt FC Barcelona on the field far more than one 
that can be planned for. Barcelona subsequently appealed the case to CAS 
who, in late December 2014, days before the first transfer window of 2015 
opened, announced that the appeal had been rejected and that the ban would 
enter into force immediately. The result is that FC Barcelona will be unable 
to sign any players for the duration of 2015. In order to ensure that the ban 
was in place for the start of the transfer window, CAS released the decision 
without its reasoning, which at the time of writing remains unpublished, so 
further comment on the case is not possible. 
One thing that appears to be certain is that, in spite of a clear stance from 
FIFA and CAS that the wording and spirit of Article 19 RSTP must be up-
held, the current market in young footballers from abroad continues to thrive. 
There is ample evidence that current recruitment strategies are well embed-
ded in a number of regions across the world and that clubs will search out 
legal loopholes to ensure they can continue to tap these markets. In spite of 
                                                          
14 As cited by Riach 2014. 
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this prominent rhetoric from both FIFA and CAS in support of a provision 
that claims to protect minors, it is clear that systemic issues within the foot-
ball industry are fuelling practices that run counter to both the content and 
spirit of Article 19 RSTP. Aside from these cases, brought by FIFA and up-
held by CAS, there appears to be little work to challenge a culture which both 
accepts and nurtures a high level of recruitment from abroad by clubs at eve-
ry level of European football. In light of the football industry’s failure, then, 
to tackle on its own this phenomenon, the argument now turns to the role of 
the EU, as both a legal and political body, in mobilising a response that meets 
the children’s rights challenges presented by this phenomenon. 
 5. Making the Case for EU Intervention 
Previous sections have demonstrated that a prohibition on transfers of foot-
ballers under the age of 18 from outside the EU (and under 16 within the EU) 
has not curbed a buoyant trade in young people from abroad who dream of 
playing in Europe’s football leagues, but who experience extremely varied 
degrees of success. This final section argues that the EU has a role to play in 
exploring, highlighting and combating the more damaging consequences of 
this phenomenon. To begin, it is important to underline that this argument 
does not suggest the football industry itself does not have a fundamental role 
to play in addressing this issue – indeed, any changes to the regulation of the 
transfer system or other measures to promote the rights of children in this 
scenario would require the full support and cooperation of relevant governing 
bodies. However, in light of the limited progress made thus far by FIFA’s 
attempts to regulate the international transfer of minors – and given the EU’s 
increased activities in recent years in relation to both children’s rights and 
sport – it is argued that the supranational body, working alongside stakehold-
ers from within the industry, has a role to play in spearheading a more effec-
tive response. The discussion that follows is necessarily sensitive to the lim-
ited legal competences enjoyed by the EU in relation to both children’s rights 
and sport, and considers the range of legal and policy options open to the EU, 
including those which move beyond a traditional legally binding regulatory 
approach. Crucially, this allows suggestions to be made for a role for the EU 
which has at its heart the need to work with the football industry to address 
this issue.  
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5.1 The rationale for EU intervention from a children’s 
rights perspective 
Whilst the EU has historically played a very hands-off role, recent years have 
seen an increase in activities targeting young people in a wide range of legal 
and policy areas and the emergence of an explicit agenda in relation to chil-
dren’s rights (Commission 2011). Justification for supranational intervention 
in this arena clusters around two central arguments, both of which support the 
contention ventured here that the EU has a role to play in addressing the 
impact of the transfer system on the rights of young migrant footballers. 
First, there is a case for EU action in relation to children’s rights where su-
pranational intervention has added-value: that is, where the EU is able to 
achieve a more effective result through a single response, than each Member 
State would acting alone (Stalford 2012: 7). Often this occurs in relation to 
issues that have a cross-border or cross-jurisdictional element, such as di-
vorce and parental responsibility disputes arising from international family 
breakdown (Stalford 2012: 89). This argument is certainly relevant here: 
football is heavily regulated at international level by both FIFA and UEFA 
and the transfer system operates, certainly since Bosman, in an inherently 
cross-national manner. Here, however, the added-value of EU intervention 
lies equally potently in the coherence of a coordinated approach and the effi-
ciency of working together to confront a problem that manifests itself across 
a number of Member States, with all of Europe’s professional football 
leagues boasting players recruited from abroad.  
Secondly, the EU, in acting within established areas of competence, can 
create policy ‘spill-overs’ which operate to the detriment of young people, 
such that where this happens there is clear justification for supranational 
intervention in the children’s rights arena (Stalford and Drywood 2009: 146). 
Broadly speaking, protection of fundamental rights by the EU is constitution-
alised in Article 6 Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This protection 
manifests itself in a number of ways, but at its heart lies the basic proposition 
that the EU must ensure its powers are exercised in a way that respects the 
rights recognised in a number of instruments, most explicitly the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the ECHR (Article 6 TEU). 
This is supplemented by a reference to the Union’s role in contributing to 
protection of the rights of the child found in Article 3 TEU, a provision 
which, rather than creating additional legislative powers, instead outlines a 
set of values and principles which inform the exercise of existing EU compe-
tences. The Court has ruled that the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child informs general principles of EU law and can, therefore, be used 
to review the legality of the acts of the institutions, as well as the implemen-
tation of Union law, or indeed any activities that fall within the scope of 
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Union law (Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] E.C.R. I-5769). As 
an example, in Dynamic Medien (Case C-244/06 [2008] ECR I-505), the 
Court found that protection of the child was a legitimate interest justifying a 
breach of free movement of goods principles. Equally, the Court recognised 
in its decision in Bernard (Case C-325/08 [2010] ECR I-02177) that the post-
Bosman system of replacing transfer fees with the payment of compensation 
to a footballer’s former club to reflect their investment in the player’s train-
ing in principle constituted a breach of free movement provisions, but could 
be justified on the basis that it encourages the recruitment and training of 
young players. In other words: the Court has made it clear that protection of 
the rights of the child informs the exercise of free movement law and, indeed, 
can act as a brake on the pursuit of this objective. Given the current football 
transfer system has been significantly shaped by the Bosman ruling – and the 
decision to apply free movement law to this aspect of sporting regulation – a 
link is formed between its impact on the status of individual players and the 
constitutionalised obligation to respect fundamental rights. It has been shown 
that, through its liberalising effect on the transfer system, the Bosman ruling 
contributed to an environment in which the recruitment of young players 
from abroad has thrived. Indeed, trends such as the internationalisation of 
professional football and the emphasis on recruiting players at a young age in 
order to acquire cheap talent, or as a response to the homegrown players rule, 
are arguably – directly or indirectly – linked to the CJEU’s decision in 
Bosman to apply free movement provisions to the football transfer system. It 
can, therefore, be argued that the EU’s role in aggravating a children’s rights 
issue creates an obligation to pursue activities that mitigate these ill effects.  
That said, it should not be assumed that an argument which ‘constitution-
alises’ the need for EU action in this area also suggests that this ought to take 
the form of judicial intervention or binding legislation, something that would 
be legally difficult given the EU enjoys no standalone legislative competence 
in relation to children’s rights. A central characteristic of EU children’s rights 
activities, as they have developed over recent years, is the deployment of a 
number of alternative ‘soft’ modes of governance that offer effective tools to 
address the detrimental impact that ‘hard’ law can have on the status of 
young people (Stalford and Drywood 2009; Drywood 2010). So, whilst it is 
the connection to free movement law that provides the ‘hook’ for EU inter-
vention – since respecting free movement seems to have increased the likeli-
hood of young players being recruited from abroad – the impact of this does 
not have to be mitigated through the hard law approaches traditionally asso-
ciated with the internal market. Furthermore, as will be argued in the follow-
ing section, the most appropriate legal basis for EU activity to address the 
impact of the transfer system on young migrant footballers is Article 165 
TFEU; a competence which grants powers to act in support of, to coordinate 
and to supplement Member State actions in the field of sport. This type of 
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competence is typically associated with the adoption of broad guidelines or 
incentive measures, or facilitating the exchange of information about best 
practice (Dashwood et al 2011: 104) and, therefore, primarily provides a 
legal basis for soft law activities. Furthermore, it has been observed that the 
range of soft law tools at the Union’s disposal is well suited to politically or 
culturally sensitive areas that require a more participatory and consensus-
based form of supranational governance (Trubek/Trubek 2005; Beveridge/
Velluti 2008), suggesting that this approach is well suited to an issue that 
requires the delicate balancing of a number of competing agendas and respect 
for the deeply engrained principle of sports’ governing bodies’ autonomy. 
5.2 The rationale for EU intervention from a sports 
perspective 
The EU’s competence to support, coordinate and supplement activities in 
relation to sport was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Crucially, this provi-
sion includes the direction that ‘Union action shall be aimed at  … protecting 
the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially 
the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen’ (Article 165(2) TFEU; emphasis 
added). Read in conjunction with supranational obligations in relation to 
children’s rights, outlined above, it is argued that there is a clear basis for EU 
intervention in relation to the impact on young people of a trade in migrant 
footballers where there is a political desire to push an agenda forward. Fur-
ther, it is argued that this political desire is, indeed, present for two principal 
reasons: first, that sports policy at EU level has, in recent years, been shaped 
by a move towards the promotion of social, and not solely economic, objec-
tives; second, that there is strong evidence of a desire to address the specific 
situation of young migrant footballers from within both the Commission and 
the European Parliament.  
Whilst the EU initially entered the arena of sports law in the early 1970s 
as a by-product of its competences in other areas, particularly free movement 
and competition law (Case 36/74 Walrave[1974] ECR 1405; Case 13/76 
Donà [1976] ECR 1333; Case 222/86 Heylens[1987] ECR 4097; Bosman), 
more recent years have seen the emergence of a genuine supranational sports 
policy, that is a more holistic and coherent agenda that addresses sport as a 
policy area in its own right (rather than merely as an accidental subject of EU 
law). Crucially, the institutions have made efforts to move away from an 
engagement with sport in a purely economic context and to emphasise its 
social value. A critical reason for this was that the Bosman decision – and 
particularly the effect it had upon the earning powers of footballers – gave a 
sense that the EU’s impact in the sporting arena was not necessarily a posi-
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tive one, and quite possibly inconsistent with its emerging social and citizen-
ship based objectives: 
The EU was seen as a venue through which the full commercial potential of sport could be 
exploited at the expense of the real values of the game. As such, the EU was not reconnect-
ing itself with its citizens, it was taking the people’s game further away from them. A body 
of opinion emerged within the EU seeking to give the socio-cultural and integrationist 
qualities of sport a higher priority and for sport to be afforded a higher level of protection 
from EU law. (Parrish 2003: 14) 
When the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 a short Declaration was 
annexed to the document emphasising ‘the social significance of sport’ and 
calling on EU bodies ‘to listen to sports associations when important ques-
tions affecting sport are at issue’ (OJ C 340/136 10.11.1997). The most ex-
plicit articulation of the scope and content of EU sports policy is now found 
in the Commission’s White Paper on Sport (Commission 2007), a document 
which addresses the economic dimension of sport and its organisation, but 
places the most significance on its societal role. Indeed, a strong feature of 
the White Paper is the prominence given to the protection of minors and the 
need to combat exploitation of young people in professional sport. The 
Commission highlights bad practices by some agents, including the exploita-
tion of young players, as damaging the sport and raising questions about its 
governance, going on to state that the health and security of minor players 
must be protected (Commission 2007: 15). Furthermore, the potentially 
fraught status of young migrant footballers who are unsuccessful in securing 
a professional career is acknowledged and identified as a concern: 
The most serious problem concerns children who are not selected for competitions and 
abandoned in a foreign country, often falling in this way in an irregular position which 
fosters their further exploitation. Although in most cases this phenomenon does not fall 
into the legal definition of trafficking in human beings, it is unacceptable given the funda-
mental values recognised by the EU and its Member States. It is also contrary to the values 
of sport. (Commission 2007: 16) 
The European Parliament has also drawn attention to the practices referred to 
above, itself preferring to categorise them as trafficking (European Parlia-
ment 2007). The Parliament makes a direct link between the recruitment of 
very young players and the introduction of the homegrown players rule and 
raises concerns over the status of ‘trafficked’ players from the point of dis-
covery, through to recruitment and reception and their welfare in the event 
that they are not selected by a European team (European Parliament 2007: 
Paras. 35-38). It also highlights the importance of educational provision for 
young players (European Parliament 2007: Para. 39). The level of awareness 
shown by the institutions in relation to the children’s rights issues relating to 
the status of young migrant footballers, and the prominence given to these 
concerns in key policy documents, establishes a clear political desire to ad-
dress this question at EU level.  
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5.3 Softly, softly: The use of alternative modes of EU 
governance in the context of children’s rights and sport 
This, of course, leads on to the question of what form EU intervention on this 
issue would take. As has been suggested, the relevant legal bases in relation 
to both children’s rights and sport support the use of ‘soft’ modes of govern-
ance and, indeed, these are activities which the supranational body has de-
ployed effectively in both areas in the past. Whilst an in-depth outline of 
potential EU activities to promote the rights of young migrant players in the 
football industry is beyond the scope of this chapter, some brief elaboration is 
merited in order to further bolster the central argument that the EU has a role 
to play in addressing this issue.  
First, as has been argued above, it would be neither legally possible, nor 
politically appropriate, for the EU to target a children’s rights agenda in the 
context of the football transfer system through binding legal measures. In-
deed, Garcia observes that in the post-Bosman era, much progress was made 
by the Commission in terms of the EU’s role in regulating the football indus-
try, not through the imposition of formal sanctions, but rather as a result of 
negotiations with the relevant governing bodies (Garcia 2007a). He further 
argues that football’s European governing body, UEFA, now sees the EU as 
a ‘long term strategic partner’ and cites one reason for this being that the two 
bodies enjoy a shared set of social values and a belief in their contribution to 
sport (Garcia 2007b: 216). The idea of the EU as an agenda-setter in the 
context of the football industry very much accords with the approach taken in 
relation to a number of children’s rights questions. In this context, the power-
ful political status enjoyed by the supranational body has provided a focal 
point for discussions and negotiations surrounding any coordinated activity 
where a complex range of stakeholders are involved. Stalford has observed 
that: 
The EU offers a unique forum and source of funding to bring together a range of actors at 
international, European and domestic level to share experience and best practice on such 
issues, set mutually-agreed benchmarks, and stimulate wide dissemination, awareness-
raising and policy exchange. (Stalford 2012: 7) 
The task of bringing together governing bodies, football clubs and players’ 
representatives, alongside experts on children’s rights on the issue of re-
cruitment of young players from abroad is a challenge, particularly, given the 
lack of consensus from within the football industry in relation to the appro-
priateness and efficacy of the current prohibition on international transfers of 
minors. A supranational body such as the EU enjoys a status which can 
achieve this and, crucially, possesses the funding to explore a range of op-
tions to improve the children’s rights situation for young migrant players. 
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Second, as was highlighted in an earlier section, evidence in relation to the 
children’s rights consequences of recruitment of young foreign players to 
European football is limited. This remains a chronically under-researched 
area with much of the evidence that policy-makers have to work with result-
ing from small scale investigations by journalists (for example: Brown 2014) 
or ones with a narrow regional focus (for example: Menses 2013). If effective 
responses to this situation are to be agreed upon, a solid – and fuller – evi-
dence-base is needed. Crucially, this would need to be commissioned by a 
body with the political leverage to ensure the cooperation of relevant stake-
holders. The Commission and European Parliament have previously overseen 
large-scale pan-European research into aspects of sports regulation, such as a 
2009 study on sports agents in the European Union (KEA/CDES/EOSE 
2009). Furthermore, the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency provides expert 
advice to the institutions and has produced reports on the status of groups of 
migrant children to assist policy-makers.15Alongside assisting policy-makers 
working with stakeholders within the football industry on this issue, any such 
research would have a further awareness-raising function, thus increasing 
pressure on the football industry to address it. 
Thirdly, as the EU continues to engage with the football industry, primari-
ly through economic aspects of its regulation, the rights of children impacted 
by these legal and policy developments must be mainstreamed into its activi-
ties. Children’s rights mainstreaming has been defined as ‘[t]he incorporation 
of children’s rights, needs and welfare, according to the principles of the 
UNCRC, at all stages and at all levels of EU law and policy-making’ (Stal-
ford and Drywood 2009: 163). So, for example, if any future legal develop-
ments in relation to the free movement of persons or competition law were to 
impact on the football transfer system (in the way that Bosman and subse-
quent rulings did), the mainstreaming principle requires all institutions, legis-
lative and judicial, to uphold children’s rights principles through these activi-
ties. Increased awareness at institutional level of the impact of EU activities 
on the status of young migrant players, through the research activities sug-
gested above, would facilitate the mainstreaming of children’s rights when 
the supranational body exercises its competence in relation to the football 
industry. Crucially, therefore, EU actions suggested here in relation to the 
rights of young migrant players in the European football industry must be 
viewed holistically – as a package of tools at the EU’s disposal which can be 
used to increase awareness of the problem and identify ways of improving 
it – but which require the participation and cooperation of the football indus-
try itself if they are to yield any practical effects. 
                                                          
15 See http://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources for a list of FRA publications (2014-
13-10). 
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 6. Conclusion 
This chapter had two aims. The first, broader, priority was to establish the 
phenomenon surrounding the recruitment of young foreign players to Euro-
pean football clubs as an important area of analysis within children’s rights 
studies. This was done by weaving together evidence relating to the treatment 
and experiences of children with relevant provisions of the CRC. This 
demonstrated that a set of egregious children’s rights violations occur in the 
name of recruiting children to European football clubs. Surprisingly, with the 
exception of a few newspaper pieces, this phenomenon has received very 
little attention from either the NGO/charitable sector or policy-makers at any 
level. Equally, the football industry itself has failed to engage with the failure 
of its 2001 ban on the recruitment of young foreign players and the insidious 
consequences of a continued trade in migrant footballers. To fully confront 
this problem a difficult question needs to be tackled: that is, the extent to 
which it is acceptable for football clubs to profit in sporting and commercial 
terms from their current reliance on young, foreign players. There is conflict 
within the industry on this point and a failure from those outside of it to pro-
vide a platform for its discussion. Certainly, this complex question requires 
further unpacking in academic terms; subjecting the full gamut of experienc-
es of young migrant footballers to a children’s rights-based analysis is a pri-
ority for future research. Fascinating questions await surrounding the rela-
tionship between child labour and elite sport; the suggestion that the aggres-
sive recruitment of young foreign players is a form of modern slavery; and 
the appropriateness of an outright ban on minor footballers from abroad par-
ticipating in Europe’s leagues. This chapter – as the first significant analysis 
of this phenomenon – has laid down a challenge to both academic commenta-
tors and policy-makers to grapple with these questions. 
But if we are to criticise the failure of those outside the football industry to 
confront this problem, where should we target out efforts? The second central 
argument of this chapter is that the EU is – both legally and politically – the 
appropriate body to stimulate a more effective response to the children’s 
rights issues arising from current practices around the recruitment of young 
foreign players. However, rather than suggesting merely that an inherently 
cross-border phenomenon such as this would be more effectively dealt with 
via European-level intervention, the argument is rather that the supranational 
body ought to be compelled to spearhead activities to confront this problem 
because of its growing agendas in relation to both sport and children’s rights. 
Following the CJEU’s decision in Bosman two decades ago, the football 
transfer system has operated at a European level and has submitted to the 
scrutiny of EU law, the latter having a significant impact on its current opera-
tion. This is the environment in which a trade in child footballers from 
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abroad operates – often in a duplicitous and exploitative manner that has 
significant and devastating consequences for children’s enjoyment of their 
rights under the CRC. Can the EU, then, really ignore this situation given the 
constitutional status of its commitment to protecting the rights of the child 
(Article 3 TEU) and to promoting the principles enshrined in the CRC 
(Commission 2007: 4)? Of course, this would mean going into battle with 
those in the football industry who vehemently defend their treatment of 
young migrant footballers – and who show little willingness to submit to the 
ban on underage transfers of foreign players. This is a significant challenge; 
the football industry is not famed for welcoming external scrutiny of its rules 
and regulations. However, the EU has held its nerve in asserting its compe-
tence to subject the economic aspects of football regulation to free movement 
of persons and competition laws – decisions which, at the time, were phe-
nomenally unpopular within the industry. We might, therefore, question the 
promises and rhetoric of the ever expanding children’s rights agenda if the 
EU turns a blind eye to this issue. 
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